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Abstract
Eciency in the IPO (Initial Public Oering) aftermarket is tested without imposing
any restrictions on the priors about potential default at the issue date. Merging Ritter's
extended dataset (which covers the period 1975-84) with the CRSP tapes, IPOs are fol-
lowed up to ten years after issue. Across all IPOs, or when stratifying IPOs according
to issue underpricing, industry aliation or rank of entry in an industry, little evidence
against rational price behavior is found. In contrast, the market clearly over-reacts to
information about the eventual fate of low-priced issues. A suggestive relationship be-
tween irrational price behavior and subsequent takeover activity is uncovered.
Keywords: Initial Public Oering, Market Eciency, Rational Learning, Default.
JEL Classication: C22, D84, G14.
IPO Post-Issue Markets:
Questionable Predilections But Diligent Learners?

Peter Bossaerts Pierre Hillion
1 Introduction
Ever since Ritter's seminal empirical study (Ritter [1991]), the post-issue performance of
IPOs has been considered to be a puzzle. In the long run, IPOs signicantly underperform
standard benchmarks or equity in appropriately matched rms. The puzzle has been
conrmed in numerous follow-up studies (see, e.g., the Spring 1993 issue of Financial
Management; Jain and Kini [1994]; Loughran and Ritter [1995]).
The evidence is now generally interpreted as suggesting that the market is too opti-
mistic when pricing young issues. It realizes its mistakes slowly, adjusting prices as the
issues mature.
Some have argued that the biases in the market's prior at the issue date are a natural
consequence of shortsale restrictions (Miller [1977], Morris [undated]). It could also be a
mere sign of the beliefs at a particular point in time. Indeed, most studies focus on IPOs
executed the 1970-80s. That priors over this period were biased does not necessarily
imply irrationality, because the bias was only demonstrated to be there ex post, i.e., with
the benet of hindsight.
Instead, it seems much more fruitful to ask whether subsequent changes in the mar-
ket's beliefs were rational. If beliefs can be expressed in terms of the chance numbers of
classical probability theory, we know precisely what this means: changes should obey the
rules of conditional probability (Bayes' law).
Examples abound in the experimental literature on individual decision making that
not everybody uses conditional probability when learning about uncertain events. See,
e.g., El-Gamal and Grether [1995]. From the point of view of nance, however, it is

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important to know whether changes in market beliefs, as reected in prices, obey the
rules of rational learning. The goal of the present paper is to test this in the context of
IPOs.
A market that fails to update its priors rationally is one that over-reacts or under-
reacts to the advent of new information. Changes in prices do not correctly reect the
additional information, in violation of market eciency (Fama [1970]). Money is to be
made: Dutch book arguments could be used to win in betting against a market that
violates the rules of conditional probability.
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In nance terms: there is an arbitrage
opportunity.
This paper tests the rationality of price changes in the IPO aftermarket with a
methodology that requires little or no information about the actual market prior at the
issue date and how priors varied across issues. The methodology was originally devel-
oped in Bossaerts [1997] and succesfully applied to experimental winner-take-all markets
in Bondarenko and Bossaerts [1996], to digital option prices implied by index call and
put option prices in Bondarenko [1997], and to straight index call options in Bossaerts
[1997]. The applications have one thing in come: they concern securities with a clear
bankruptcy state, like the equity contracts studied here.
The framework of analysis is the following. At the launch date, it is known that
a certain number of IPOs eventually fail (default), but it is not known exactly how
many and, if the issue at hand does fail, at what time. For simplicity, the recovery rate
conditional on bankruptcy is set equal to zero.
Initial priors about the probability of bankruptcy are arbitrary and may vary across
IPOs. Price changes in the aftermarket reect rational updating of these priors from
news about the fate of the company. The market is supposed to understand how the
news relates to bankruptcy (it knows the conditional probability of the signals given the
bankruptcy status). Likewise, the market correctly predicts the future valuation of equity
in the company conditional on no default. (If default occurs, the market of course knows
that this value will be zero.)
The tests that we use to verify rational updating are simple and powerful. A novelty
is that they require the empiricist to split the available sample in a winner category (com-
panies that did not default) and a loser category (companies that defaulted). Standard
returns have to be modied slightly and weighted appropriately. If rational updating is
rejected, the sign of the statistic provides information on the nature of the ineciency:
whether the market over-reacts or under-reacts to new information.
Our methodology tests for correct updating of priors about the likely default of each
company separately. The methodology is of the event-study type: each history is mapped
in event time, with a common event time zero (the IPO date); one loses potential infor-
mation from the knowledge that two histories occured sequentially in calendar time. This
1
Dutch books could be interpreted as repeated forward contracts. See Shervish [1995], p. 654-658,
for a technical explanation.
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implies, in particular, that our methodology does not investigate whether the default his-
tory of companies oated earlier in calendar time were correctly reected in the priors at
the issue date of subsequent IPOs. Our methodology allows there to be such updating
(priors can vary arbitrarily across IPO histories), but does not study its rationality.
2
Using Ritter's sample (covering U.S. IPOs in the 1975-84 period) and following each
IPO up to 10 years after the issue date, we nd little evidence of irrationality in af-
termarket price dynamics. Looking more closely, however, we nd strong evidence of
over-reaction in low-priced issues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
data and summarizes past evidence. Section 3 presents our approach and methodology.
Section 4 discusses the aggregate empirical results; Section 5 reports tests conditional
on issue information. Section 6 briey contrasts the results from our methodology with
those from a statistic that has traditionally been used to study over-reaction and under-
reaction, namely the autocorrelation coecient. Section 7 concludes. The power of the
tests is studied in an Appendix, using a novel model of an inecient nancial market
(called the Variable Reversal Delay model).
2 The Evidence
Our results are based on a merging of Ritter's sample of IPOs in the 1975-1984 period
and the CRSP 1995 NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ monthly return tape. The two datasets
were merged on the basis of PERM number, or CUSIP when the PERM number was not
available.
The following IPOs were eliminated. (i) All the IPOs for which the EXCHANGE
variable in Ritter's dataset is equal to 4, corresponding to non-Nasdaq OTC issues. (ii)
IPOs for which the CRSP variable SHRCD, the share code, diers from 10 or 11. These
are certicates, ADRs, SBI (Shares of benecial Interest), Units, companies incorporated
outside the US, Americus Primes and Scores, closed-end funds, closed-end fund companies
incorporated outside the US, and REITS. (iii) IPOs of which the rst digit of the SIC
code equals 6 or 9, corresponding to nancial institutions, insurance, savings and loans
(6), and utilities (9).
The latter exclusion was decided on because many IPOs in that category were in
fact well-established rms that issued stock on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ because of
regulatory changes. The nature of these IPOs diers dramatically from that of the typical
one, where a young company is oated, usually in a new area of industrial activity.
3
2
Loughran and Ritter have argued that priors at the IPO date have recently gotten more in line with
the actual post-issue performance, indicating that priors are being updated between two issue dates. See
Loughran and Ritter [1995], p. 49.
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We used the SIC code that CRSP assigned to an issue on the 1995 tape to determine exclusion.
This code often deviates from Ritter's, which was constructed to better reect industry aliation on
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The nal sample contained 1,856 IPOs, down from 2,609 in Ritter's dataset. For each
IPO, trading and delisting information, as well as a vector of 120 post-issue monthly re-
turns were extracted from the CRSP tape (together with 120 synchronous CRSP equally-
weighted and value-weighted index returns). This means that ten-year post-issue perfor-
mance histories for each IPO were available.
A large fraction of these histories are incomplete, due to delisting. The delisting
information is important for the tests to be reported later. CRSP provides delisting
codes (DC), which we grouped as follows.
 Active issues: DC 100;
 Mergers: DCs 200-203;
 Exchanges: DC 300-390;
 Liquidations and forced delistings: DCs 550-588, 400 and 700; to be referred to as
Liquidations;
 Inactive but Unknown status: DCs 500-520.
We recorded the delisting status at the end of each twelve-month period after the issue
date. This status is determined as follows. Consider the end of the jth twelve-month
period. If the corresponding point in calendar time is before the recorded delisting date
or the issue was never delisted, then DC is set equal to 100 (Active issue). Otherwise, it
is set equal to the DC in the CRSP tape.
Table 1 provides descriptive information of the distribution of delisting status for each
twelve-month period. Obviously, the number of Active issues decreases as time passes.
Only 628 issues have ten-year active trading histories. This does not mean that the other
issues went sour: 323 IPOs were merged at one point in the ten-year history and 53
disappeared through an exchange of stock.
Still, 678 IPOs were listed as Liquidations at the ten-year mark. In other words, the
probability of failure is rather high (36.5% of the sample). Many of the 174 \Unknown"s
should also be considered losers. So, roughly 4 out of 10 IPOs will not be a success.
This rather high failure rate makes all the more dramatic Ritter's observation that
the post-issue performance of IPOs has been dismal. His cumulative average return goes
out to three years after the issue date, at which point about one third of the failures
(losers) have left the sample, and, hence, do not aect the average returns anymore. Of
course, this argument cuts both ways: many mergers and exchanges have also occured
prior to the three-year mark. A large fraction of these generated substantial abnormal
the IPO date itself. Hence, we ended up with some companies that were in the excluded industries at
the IPO date. Because they were later re-classied by CRSP, or considered to be in a dierent industry
altogether, these companies where deemed to be more typical IPOs, and, hence, retained in our study.
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returns, which will not aect the IPO post-issue performance measure after the merger
or exchange.
The IPO average underperformance does not change when extending the horizon
beyond Ritter's three-year window. Figure 1 displays the cumulative average return in
excess of the return on the equally weighted CRSP index (CAR-CRSP) up to ten years
after the issue date.
We normalized the CAR-CRSP with an estimate of the monthly standard deviation
of the mean excess return, multiplied by the square root of 120 (the total length of the
return histories, in months). Under the null that the average return in excess of the
index equals zero, the path of the normalized CAR-CRSP should be that of a standard
Brownian Motion. In particular, its value after t months should be a draw from a normal
distribution with mean zero and variance t=120.
4
Figure 1 demonstrates that one can reject the hypothesis that the CAR-CRSP is a
standard Brownian Motion. It is most evident from its value at particular points. For
instance, at 60 months, the CAR-CRSP is close to  4, which is far in the left tail of the
N(0; 1=2) density, and, hence, generates a very low p-value. Even after ten years, the
value of CAR-CRSP is  1:97, which is signicant at the 2.5% level.
The evidence in Figure 1 points to an anomaly: why would common stock IPOs
underperform on average a broad, equally-weighted equity index? As mentioned in the
Introduction, the puzzle is robust to further scrutiny (alternative performance bench-
marks, international evidence, seasoned issues, etc.).
Ritter also studies the aftermarket performance conditional on issue information, such
as level of IPO underpricing. This study continues the tradition. In particular, post-issue
return histories are stratied according to the following criteria.
 Underpricing: issues are sorted by size of underpricing (dierence between IPO
oer price and rst aftermarket price), and then arranged in ten deciles, numbered
0 to 9, with category 0 containing the most underpriced issues.
 Industry Classication: issues are arranged in classes depending on the rst digit
of their three-digit Standard Industry Classication Code at IPO date (as recorded
in Ritter's dataset).
 Price Level: issues are sorted by oer price (as recorded in Ritter's dataset), and
then arranged in ten deciles, numbered 0 to 9, with category 9 containing the most
expensive issues.
 Entry Rank: issues are sorted by order of entry in each industry (determined by the
three-digit Standard Industry Classication Code, as recorded in Ritter's dataset)
and arranged in corresponding categories. Category 1 includes the IPOs that where
4
This follows from a standard functional central limit theorem.
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recorded to be the rst (in the dataset) in their respective industries. Category 2
contains all second-comers. Etc.
With the Underpricing categorization, one can investigate whether the IPO anomaly
is specic to extremely underpriced issues. Likewise, the Industry Classication, Price
Level and Entry Rank categorizations enable one to relate aftermarket underperformance
to industry and oer price, respectively, or to study whether the anomaly is specic to
early issues in an industry.
3 Theory
3.1 Mere Optimism Or Fads?
Ritter's ndings have been interpreted as evidence of optimism, or even fads. The term
fads reects something irrational: the market overprices the issues, and stubbornly holds
on to its beliefs, until nally correcting in the face of evidence of failures.
In fact, the optimism is not necessarily irrational. Optimism is merely a characteri-
zation of someone's beliefs at a point in time. Optimism becomes irrational only if it is
not corrected (updated) properly as contrary evidence emerges. So, optimism is not the
problem; instead, the obstinacy is.
Rationality is a property of learning, and not of beliefs. The aim of this paper is to
investigate whether IPO underperformance is merely a consequence of optimistic beliefs
at the issue date of the IPOs in Ritter's dataset, or whether it also reects obstinacy (or
its opposite, overexuberance). The latter would be evidence of irrationality.
The paper does so in the context of a framework which allows the empiricist to be
agnostic of the actual priors of the market at the issue date and to avoid specication of
the payo generating process beyond the proposition that there is a bankruptcy state in
which the issue becomes worthless.
The methodology was originally developed in Bossaerts [1997] and will be summarized
here in terms of the IPO application. The framework is presented rst; the tests are
discussed next.
3.2 Framework
Let t index (event) time, measured in, say, months. We want to test rational learning in
a period up to T months after the issue date, based on the status of the IPO at some
future reference point T

> T . T is a xed point in event time, e.g., 18 months after the
issue date, or T is the date of the last available price if delisting occured prior to this
xed point.
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Assuming that no dividends are paid, or that dividends are continuously reinvested,
the price at t, p
t
, predicts the value of equity (with dividends reinvested) in the future.
Let V
T

denote the value of equity at the future reference point T

. Let R
F;t
be the
(deterministic) riskfree rate in month t. Let 
t
denote the market's information at time
t. Assuming risk neutrality,
p
t
=
1
(1 +R
F;t+1
):::(1 +R
F;T

)
E[V
T

j
t
]: (1)
The conditional expectation in this expression is computed on the basis of the market's
subjective beliefs, which need not coincide with the actual distribution of V
T

. It will be
specied shortly to what extent the market's beliefs may be incorrect.
Risk neutrality and deterministic interest rates will be assumed throughout. It should
be emphasized that the tests reported below could be altered to accomodate stochastic
interest rates, or even risk aversion. See Bossaerts [1997]. Nevertheless, we will be able
to report that our theory provides a clean and parsimonious interpretation of post-IPO
performance while sticking to risk neutrality and deterministic interest rates.
By time T

, the issue may have defaulted, in which case the recovery rate is assumed
to be zero, and, hence, V
T

= 0.
5
Absent bankruptcy, V
T

> 0. The market may hold
incorrect beliefs about the frequency of occurence of bankruptcy. Conditional on no
default, however, the market's beliefs about the value V
T

are correct.
The actual bias in the market's prior about bankruptcy are left unspecied. It can be
arbitrary. Moreover, it can vary across issues. We do require, however, that the market
learn rationally about the potential bankruptcy of individual issues, using its information

t
. In other words, the market uses the rules of conditional probability (Bayes' law) to
update its beliefs.
It was mentioned that the position of the reference date T

is arbitrary: any date
after T would do. It must lie after T , however (T

> T ). This is because we cannot allow
for perfect revelation that the company defaulted during the period for which returns are
computed (t = 1; :::; T ). Part of our analysis will require us to compute returns with the
end-of-period price as basis. These risk to be zero if default is revealed to have occured,
making the corresponding return measure unbounded. This causes obvious statistical
problems.
6
5
It is possible to accomodate a nonzero recovery value. It is necessary, however, that the recovery
value be xed. The test results that are reported in this paper should be adjusted slightly if the recovery
value is argued to be nonzero.
6
See Bossaerts [1997] for an in-depth analysis. In the IPO study, many companies were known to
have defaulted prior to our reference date T

. This does not invalidate our tests, however: the important
restriction is that knowledge of default is not reected in the price history we use to compute returns,
i.e., prices at dates t = 1; 2; :::; T . Delisting announcements of distressed rms invariably occur after the
last available price on the CRSP tape, T . Hence, T is always before potential bankruptcy revelation.
For a related point, see Shumway [1997].
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In our world, it will no longer be true that changes in prices (properly deated) will
be unpredictable. Mathematically,
E

[
1
1 +R
F;t+1
p
t+1
  p
t
j
t
]
may be nonzero. In contrast with (1), the conditional expectation is now computed from
the actual (true) distribution of price changes over month t+1 across issues (an asterisk
makes this distinction clear). Dening the excess return to be
r
t+1
=
1
1+R
F;t+1
p
t+1
  p
t
p
t
;
this can be translated to mean that the (excess) return may be nonzero on average.
Mathematically, the following need not hold:
E

[r
t+1
j
t
] = 0: (2)
Yet, extant studies of IPOs have focused on testing whether (2) holds. The tests
reject. Rejections occur even when adjusting returns for risk by, e.g., subtracting the
(excess) return on a broad index.
3.3 Methodology
We allow beliefs about the probability of bankruptcy to be arbitrary, and even to vary
across issues. Moreover, we remain agnostic about the processes generating payos and
information. In such a context, one would reasonably conjecture that rational learning
does not impose falsiable restrictions. In other words, any set of price histories could
be explainable in terms of some set of biases in the market's prior and some payo and
information generating processes.
Bossaerts [1997] proves that this conjecture is wrong. Rational learning does restrict
the dynamic behavior of prices, even in this fairly generic environment. The restrictions
are not apparent from a study of excess returns as in extant studies of IPOs.
Foremost, the restrictions emerge only after splitting the sample in two subsamples,
one of histories of winners (issues that did not default by T

) and those of losers (issues
that defaulted by T

). In fact, this is a virtue: it directly addresses an issue that
plagues the interpretation of extant empirical results. The abnormal behavior of the
(normalized) cumulative average return in Figure 1, for instance, could be attributed
to complex selection biases, because the composition of the cross-section on which the
performance measure is based changes with event time.
Further, the selection bias introduced by studying the subsamples of winners and
losers separately implies that (excess) returns will not necessarily be equal to zero, even
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if priors happen to be correct. Indeed, excess returns on winners, for instance, can be
expected to be positive on average. As a consequence, performance measures that dier
from the traditional return will have to be studied.
Here are the main restrictions.
First, consider the winners, i.e., IPOs that did not default before T

. Dene the
modied (excess) return:
x
t+1
=
1
1+R
F;t+1
p
t+1
  p
t
1
1+R
F;t+1
p
t+1
=
p
t+1
  (1 +R
F;t+1
)p
t
p
t+1
: (3)
The modied (excess) return diers from the traditional return in that the future (de-
ated) price is used as basis.
For W issues that did not default before T

(indexed i = 1; :::;W ), compute the
average modied excess return:
1
W
W
X
i=1
 
1
T   1
T 1
X
t=1
x
i;t+1
!
: (4)
Fact 1 For winners, the expected average modied excess return is nonpositive. If the
winners' payo is random, the expected average modied excess return is strictly negative.
To build some intuition as to why this Fact is true, consider the average traditional
(excess) return. If this is computed on the basis of histories of winners only, one expects
a positive bias, at least (and this is important), if the market correctly reacted to news
that the issues were going to be winners. To oset this bias, positive (excess) returns
should be multiplied by a factor smaller than one, and negative (excess) returns should
be multiplied by a factor larger than one. The ratio p
t
=(p
t+1
=(1 + R
F;t+1
)) is such a
factor. Multiplying the traditional (excess) return with this factor produces the modied
(excess) return. Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration. It turns out that the chosen
factor more than osets the bias; the resulting variable, namely, the modied (excess)
return, will be nonpositive on average. It will be strictly negative if the payo is random.
Fact 1 is an implication of rational learning. In particular, the strict negativity of the
modied (excess) return obtains not just because the market reacted favorably to news
that the issues at hand eventually became winners, but precisely because this reaction
was correct, i.e., in accordance with Bayes' law.
It deserves emphasis that market priors about the likely default of the issue may be
arbitrary; in particular, they need not be correct, and they can vary across issues.
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A specic weighting scheme makes the average modied excess return zero. Let V
i;T

denote the time-T

value on winner issue i (i = 1; :::;W ). Consider the following weighted
average modied excess return:
1
W
W
X
i=1
V
i;T

 
1
T   1
T 1
X
t=1
x
i;t+1
!
: (5)
Fact 2 For winners, the expected weighted average modied excess return is zero.
Again, the intuition is simple. The weighting scheme gives more weight to issues with
a large payo at T

. These are the issues that must also have had the larger price run-
up, i.e., higher (modied excess) returns, in anticipation of the larger payo. Indeed, we
assume that market prices correctly incorporate the generally favorable information. Is-
sues with lower time-T

values have had lower (modied excess) returns, but are weighted
less in the weighted average modied excess return. Altogether, the weighted average
modied excess return is expected to be zero.
Again, it should be underscored that Fact 2 obtains irrespective of the market's prior
about default: it may be biased and it may vary across issues.
Some may nd Fact 1 to be redundant, in view of the cleaner restriction in Fact 2.
Fact 2, however, uses a weighting which may aect the power of the test, depending on
the data at hand. We will discuss the issue of power shortly.
The restrictions in Facts 1 and 2 apply only to modied returns computed for winners.
Consider next the losers, i.e., issues that defaulted before T

.
Here we need a restriction on the distribution of the market's prior about likely default
across issues. In particular, it must be diuse (non-informative). In other words, the
market's prior about default must not be xed and its distribution must not be biased in
a particular direction (optimism, pessimism). The fact that the prior must not be xed
implies that it cannot be correct either.
For L losers, indexed i = 1; :::; L, compute the average excess return:
1
L
L
X
i=1
 
1
T   1
T 1
X
t=1
r
i;t+1
!
: (6)
Fact 3 For losers, the expected average excess return is zero if the market's prior about
default is diuse across IPOs.
This Fact follows from a study of the behavior of securities prices in reverse time.
In particular, consider the question whether one can back-predict prices of losing issues.
The answer turns out to be negative when the distribution of the market's prior is diuse.
For if this distribution were informative because, say, priors are xed at the correct level,
then a low price level would indicate that prices must have decreased from an average
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(correct) initial level. Hence, returns could be back-predicted to have been negative on
average.
If returns cannot be back-predicted from the price level, their unconditional average
must also be zero, by the law of the iterated expectation. This is what Fact 3 states.
Fact 3 leads to a joint test of the proposition that the market updates its priors about
default rationally and that the distribution of the priors is diuse across IPOs. Rejections
may merely reect violation of the latter, and not of the former.
The three Facts were expressed in terms of unconditional averages. Facts 1 and 2 also
obtain if conditioning on issue information, such as IPO underpricing or IPO oer price.
Fact 4 Facts 1 and 2 continue to hold when the averages are computed for subclasses of
winning IPOs formed on the basis of issue information.
If the averages are not computed from the rst aftermarket trade on, but from some
future initial date  < T , Facts 1 and 2 also hold when conditioning on information that
emerged after the issue date, up to time  .
The four Facts can easily be tested, because they restrict the behavior of readily
available statistics, based on simple price information. We chose not to use absolute price
information, but wealth ratios, based on an investment at IPO of $1, with reinvestment
of possible dividends. That way, the future values V
i;T

become normalized, reducing
their cross-sectional variation, and improving the power of tests of Fact 2.
We also decided to split the winner and loser categories into subclasses. Winners
were stratied into Active, Mergers and Exchanges, in accordance with the classication
explained in the previous section. Likewise, losers were subdivided into Liquidations and
Unknown.
The Facts do not necessarily hold for these subclasses, which are formed on the basis
of future information beyond the default status. Nevertheless, the rejections of some of
the Facts for some subclasses would be informative about certain issues of corporate
nance. For instance, if we only discover violations of Fact 2 in the Mergers category, we
could be lead to believe that mergers occur because of irrational price behavior. We will
elaborate on this point when we discuss the results.
The reader may have wondered about the asymmetry in the results for winners and
losers. This is due to the asymmetry of the framework: winners pay a random amount,
losers pay a xed, known quantity (zero). Symmetry re-emerges when winners pay a
xed amount as well, as in the case of digital options, which pay $1 if they mature in
the money. There, the weighted average modied return coincides with the (unweighted)
average modied return. Hence, Facts 1 and 2 together imply that the average modied
return of winning digital options will be zero if learning is rational. For digital options
that mature out of the money, the traditional return must be zero (Fact 3). But the
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traditional return becomes a modied return when expressed in reverse time. Since the
result for losers is obtained from a reverse-time analysis, it should actually be stated as
implying that the modied return in reverse time should be zero. Altogether, the average
modied return forward in time will be zero for winners; the average modied return in
reverse time will be zero for losers. Symmetry is restored.
3.4 Meaning Of Rejections
Before turning to the results, it is important to delineate the information that would be
conveyed by rejections of the Facts.
Rejections of Fact 3 could merely reect violations of the assumption that the dis-
tribution of the market's prior about bankrupcty is diuse. When the market's prior is
correct, as has been required in tests of the rationality of post-IPO price performance in
extant research, one expects there to be violations. In fact, unless one is convinced that
the distribution of the market's prior is diuse, one would hope to discover rejections;
this would indicate that the test has power.
Most information could be conveyed by tests of Fact 2, because, unlike Fact 1, the
alternative hypothesis would include two cases: positive and negative weighted average
modied excess returns. Here is an interpretation in terms of a market whose price
reaction may be correct in the long run, but either too slow or too excessive in the short
run.
Remember the intuition behind Facts 1 and 2: the traditional (excess) return on
winners is positive, because of the selection bias and the market's learning; to oset this,
(excess) returns must be multiplied by a factor which is below one for positive returns and
above one for negative returns; if the market learns rationally, the factor that does the
job is the ratio of today's price over tomorrow's (deated) price; it converts the standard
(excess) return into the modied (excess) return.
Positive weighted average modied excess returns are a sign of under-reaction of the
market to new information. In other words, price changes amount only to a fraction
of the full Bayesian update; further adjustments are made later. It implies that price
movements are less extreme than in the rational case, making the factor that transforms
standard returns into modied returns less variable. As a result, the bias caused by
looking only at winners is not entirely oset.
Negative weighted average modied excess returns are a sign of over-reaction of the
market to new information. Price changes overcompensate for the Bayesian update,
creating the necessity for future reversals. It implies that price movements are more
extreme than in the rational case, making the factor that transforms traditional returns
into modied returns more variable. Hence, the selection bias is over-adjusted.
Figure 3 displays three price paths for a digital option that matures in the money.
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A digital option either pays $1 or $0. Because the payo in the no-default state is xed
and known ($1), the weighted average modied return and the average modied return
coincide, and must both be zero if prices reect correct updating. The solid line represents
such a case: the average modied return equals 0.05%. In an over-reacting market, prices
are more volatile than warranted by rational price adjustment. The dashed line depicts
such a case. The average modied return is negative and almost two orders of magnitude
larger (-1.06%). The dotted line represents under-reaction: prices adjust too slowly to
new information. The average modied return is positive (1.02%).
In classical tests of market eciency, return autocorrelations convey signals of over-
reaction and under-reaction of the market to new information. If priors may be biased,
return autocorrelations do not provide the right signal. Moreover, autocorrelations only
provide information about the behavior of deviations of returns from the mean; they do
not test the appropriateness of the mean return.
In contrast, the weighted average modied return of winners must be zero even if
priors are biased (Fact 2). Moreover, it conveys information about the correctness of
both price changes net of the average change, and the average change itself, as the above
discussion points out.
Because of their popularity in tests of market eciency, we will come back to return
autocorrelations at the end of the presentation of the results. We will document return
autocorrelations for IPOs. Their message is confusing, in contrast to the conclusions we
draw from tests of our Facts.
In the Appendix, we construct a simple model of an over-reacting or under-reacting
market. The construction is the basis for a Monte Carlo analysis of the power of tests
based of Fact 2. It also reveals that autocorrelations may be low even in a substantially
irrational market. In contrast, tests based on Fact 2 have power.
4 Unconditional Tests
We rst report results from unconditional tests (Facts 1 to 3), for winners and losers
separately.
4.1 Winners
Figures 4 to 6 provide graphical evidence about Facts 1 to 3 for each of the winner
subcategories. The plots provide point estimates and 95% condence intervals.
The Figures report averages for dierent post-issue reference points (T

in the pre-
vious section), spaced at twelve-month intervals. For each reference date, averages were
computed using return data from the rst after-market trade up to six months before
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the reference date at the latest. (In terms of the notation of the previous Section, T is
positioned up to six months before T

.)
IPOs were followed up to ten years after issue date; hence, there were ten reference
points, at the end of months 12, 24, ...,120. Reference point values (V
i;T

in the pre-
vious section) for issues that merged or were exchanged (Mergers and Exchanges) were
computed by riskfree reinvesting all the wealth accumulated up to the date of the last
available return on the CRSP tape.
The three-month Treasury bill rate was used throughout for riskfree discounting.
The averages displayed in the Figures are computed on the basis of overlapping periods
(the averages for the period ending after two years are based on observations from the
rst year as well). Hence, the results are not independent across reference points. This
continues a tradition of the event-study literature in general and the empirical IPO
literature in particular.
In addition to the average modied excess return, the average (traditional) excess
return and the weighted average modied excess return, the Figures display results for
the weighted average traditional excess return. This statistic is computed from (5) after
substituting the traditional excess return r
i;t+1
for the modied excess return x
i;t+1
.
It gives a good benchmark to gauge the power of the test. (Of course, the presence
of rejections in itself will conrm power.) We expect the average traditional returns,
weighted or not, to be strictly positive, because of the bias from winner selection. The
power of the tests should be questioned, however, if the weighted average excess return
is seldom found to be signicantly positive.
Our reporting the (equally weighted) average traditional return in the Figures plays
the same role: one expects it to be signicantly positive; if not, there may be too much
noise in the data for our tests to be powerful.
Fact 1 is overwhelmingly accepted. In the case of Active issues (by far the most numer-
ous subclass), we reject for all future reference points that the average modied excess
return is non-negative. In contrast, the average traditional excess return is signicantly
positive for all reference points beyond two years.
There are few mergers in the rst year after an issue (see Table 1), which explains
why the average modied excess return is signicantly negative only from the second
year on. Likewise, the positive selection bias shows up in the average traditional excess
return only beyond the rst 5 years.
There are even less observations on exchanges, which explains why the average mod-
ied excess return is signicantly negative only from the sixth year on, and the average
traditional excess return becomes signicantly positive only after ve years.
The restriction of Fact 2, that the weighted average modied excess return ought to be
zero, is never rejected. Contrast this with the weighted average traditional excess return,
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which is always signicantly positive (despite the variability of the weights), except when
few observations are available (rst year for Mergers; rst and second year for Exchanges).
Based on the evidence from the unconditional tests, it is fair to conclude that the
post-issue price series do not reect any irrationality. Priors may have been biased, but
this did not keep the market from correctly learning about future values.
4.2 Losers
Figure 7 displays evidence against Fact 3 for the two loser categories, Liquidations and
Unknown: the average (traditional) excess return is almost invariably signicantly neg-
ative.
It is not clear whether this reects irrational price adjustment in the loser family. As
mentioned in the previous section, Fact 3 requires the distribution of market priors to be
diuse across issues. If priors are xed (which certainly would be the case if the market
held correct beliefs), one expects to see violations of Fact 3.
5 Conditioning On Issue Information
We now report results on price histories sampled on the basis of information from the
IPO itself. This should verify Fact 4. We will focus on the weighted average modied
excess return, which is the most convenient and cleanest statistic to gauge the rationality
of price behavior in the aftermarket.
5.1 Underpricing
Figure 8 demonstrates that there is no evidence of irrationality in any specic subcategory
of Active issues based on issue underpricing, conrming the unconditional evidence. With
few exceptions, the weighted average modied return is insignicantly dierent from zero,
conrming Fact 2.
There is some evidence against Fact 2 in decile 7 of the Mergers and deciles 8 and 9
of the Exchanges (although the latter evidence must be treated with caution because of
scarcity of observations). See Figures 9 and 10. The lack of any specic relationship
between underpricing decile and evidence against Fact 2 (why decile 7 of the Mergers?)
leads us to conclude that the evidence against rational aftermarket price behavior is
dubious.
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5.2 Industry Code
Using Ritter's industry classication, we nd some systematic, industry-specic evidence
against Fact 2. See Figures 11 to 13. Industry 1 (with Standard Industry Classica-
tion Code 1**) generates signicantly negative weighted average modied exess returns
across the three winner categories. This appears to indicate that the IPO aftermarket in
industry 1 over-reacts to new information.
For Exchanges, evidence of over-reaction also emerges in industries 4 and 5, and of
under-reaction (signicantly positive weighted average modied excess returns) in indus-
try 8. Nevertheless, the scarcity of observations cautions us to draw strong conclusions.
5.3 Initial Price Level
The most solid evidence against Fact 2 emerges from low-priced issues. Figures 14 to 16
displays ample rejections for the three lowest deciles, and some scattered rejections in
deciles 4 to 6. In all the rejections, the weighted average modied excess return is
negative, which would imply that the aftermarket over-reacts to new information.
It is remarkable that issue price level would have anything to do with irrationality
in the aftermarket. One usually suspects issue underpricing to be an indicator of irra-
tionality (\hot issues"). The evidence from the weighted average modied excess return
refutes this. In contrast, the oer price predicts aftermarket anomalies.
This is not unlike the nding of over-reaction in changes in the market value of low-
priced call options written on the S&P 500 index. See Bossaerts [1997]. Low-priced
call options are almost invariably out-of-the-money. They are the equivalent of a highly
levered position in the underlying security, i.e., an inexpensive bet. Future research
should indicate whether low-priced IPOs are similarly perceived to be cheap bets.
The solid rejections are good for the methodology that is used in this paper: they
demonstrate that the tests have power. They are bad for the status of market eciency
in the IPO market, however, because they imply that the aftermarket may not only hold
biased priors: they also reveal that the market does not even know how to rationally
react to new information.
5.4 Entry Rank
Figures 17 and 18 depict results for Active issues and Mergers as a function of their rank
of entry in an industry. Only results for the rst ten entrants are reported. Also, results
for Exchanges are not reported because of lack of observations.
Because the beginning point of the Ritter dataset is rather arbitrary, a categorization
on the basis of entry rank may not be meaningful, and, hence, produce uninformative
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results. The fact that disproportionately few early entrants lead to exchanges, however,
indicates that the classication may not be arbitrary after all.
There is little evidence against Fact 2 from early entrants in the Active category.
Some evidence in favor of over-reaction (signicantly negative weighted average modied
excess returns) emerge for later entrants; while not reported, this pattern continues all
the way to the 20th entrant. The nding would not be inconsistent with a world in which
new industries generate substantial interest of \irrational traders" once the rst few IPOs
are consummated.
Another interesting observation emerges from the signicantly positive weighted mod-
ied excess returns for the rst entrants that become merged at the end of the respective
one-year periods. These are not an artefact of a few observations (by the tenth year, 88
rst-entry IPOs fall into the Merger category).
The positive weighted average modied excess returns would reect under-reaction:
the market does not fully update on the basis of the available information. The fact that
evidence of under-reaction surfaces in the Merger category is intriguing: the eventual
merger itself may have been the consequence. This brings us to a more general point
about takeovers.
5.5 The Role Of Takeovers
Much of the evidence against Fact 2 and its premise of rational aftermarket price behavior
comes from issues that eventually merged or were exchanged. The takeover may not have
been incidental to the irrational price behavior.
The nicest example comes from the positive weighted average modied excess returns
for rst entrants in an industry, discussed in the previous Subsection. The evidence
suggests that under-reaction may have caused a takeover. If under-reaction is tantamount
to undervaluation, the implications for the benecial role of mergers, targeted at irrational
price behavior, are obvious. This observation certainly warrants future research.
6 Information In Autocorrelations
It was mentioned before that return autocorrelations may give a confusing or even mis-
leading signal about the rationality of a market. We now illustrate this.
Figure 19 plots the autocorrelations up to lag six (averages across issues) for all the
IPOs (no selection bias induced). The issues are divided into deciles depending on oer
price. The autocorrelations are generally negative but small. They are often signicant,
however. No particular pattern can be discerned: high-priced issues seem to generate
equally signicant autocorrelation coecients.
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It is not clear whether these autocorrelations reect rational adjustment of biased
initial market priors, or outright irrational price behavior (in particular, over-reaction).
Moreover, the pattern is confusing, and many would consider the level of autocorrelation
to be economically insignicant (which may be the reason why previous empirical studies
of IPOs have not dwelled upon this issue).
Our study can be understood as providing an explanation for the autocorrelation
patterns (as well as the low average performance of IPOs overall). It exemplies that
autocorrelations are not necessarily informative.
We now re-introduce a selection bias and report autocorrelations for Active issues
and Mergers separately, in Figures 20 and 21, respectively. The autocorrelations only
partially pick up the irrationality in the aftermarket behavior of low-priced issues. More
confusingly, they would also suggest anomalies in high-priced issues. The weighted av-
erage modied excess returns displayed in Figures 14 and 15 prove that this reading is
wrong.
7 Conclusion
In the aggregate, we nd little evidence against rational aftermarket price behavior for
U.S. IPOs between 1975 and 1984. If, with hindsight, initial aftermarket price levels are
found to be incorrect, it must be the consequence of optimism at the time of the IPO.
There is certainly no evidence that the market over-reacted or under-reacted as news
about the fate of each individual issue emerged.
At a more microscopic level, however, we nd solid evidence against rational price be-
havior in the aftermarket of low-priced issues. The results mostly point to over-reaction.
We also discover a relationship between aftermarket irrationality and subsequent merger
or stock exchange activity.
Throughout, we have not adjusted for risk. The assumption of risk neutrality has been
maintained. We were able to organize and explain the data without having to appeal
to models of risk premia. This is attractive, for two reasons. Models of risk premia are
controversial; also, for reasonable levels of risk aversion, risk premia are of second order,
and, hence, one can question their potential to explain actual excess returns.
In our replication of Ritter's results, however, we computed IPO returns in excess
of the return on the equally weighted CRSP index. When we plot returns in excess of
the riskfree rate (which is the appropriate benchmark under risk neutrality), we nd a
signicant overperformance at the ten-year reference point. See Figure 1. How, then,
should we interpret this nding?
As mentioned when discussing Figure 1 earlier on, one ought to be cautious because
of selection biases: as time progresses, the performance index is subject to a severe
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survivorship bias. In particular, a large fraction of distressed rms quit the sample. In
itself, this could explain the outperformance.
Absent selection biases, we would still not insist on zero outperformance, however,
because an integral part of our approach has been to allow the market to have biased
priors at the issue date. In other words, the theory of market eciency on which our tests
are based does not imply that average returns in excess of the riskfree rate must be zero.
Plots of (normalized) cumulative average returns could go in any direction. Figure 1
conrms this.
If one is unwilling to ignore the selection biases that plague the interpretation of plots
like Figure 1: our methodology addresses this problem directly. Indeed, the tests require
the very selection biases that cause the unease. In particular, returns on winners and
losers have to be analyzed separately.
Let us state this dierently. The interpretation of standard tests of eciency of
the IPO aftermarket is rendered dicult, if not impossible, by complex selection biases.
Which implies, in particular, that one should not jump too quickly to conclusions about
the biases in the market's priors at the issue date. In contrast, this paper demonstrates
that market eciency can be tested without requiring that priors be unbiased. Stronger
even, the tests allow one to remain agnostic about the nature of priors. They better do:
eciency is a proposition about whether the market incorporates information correctly
in prices, i.e., whether it learns rationally, and not about priors. Only methodological
constraints hitherto forced the empirical nance literature to confound the two.
The methodology in the present paper could be applied to event studies of other
nancial markets, such as the markets for corporate or sovereign bonds. In general, it
can be used to study the prices of any nancial contract that features a clear \default
state," in which a xed and known payout occurs. This includes straight call options, as
illustrated in Bossaerts [1997].
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Appendix
To assess the power of tests based on Fact 2, we simulated the following pricing model.
Consider three processes W
t
, W
n
t
, W
d
t
, t = 0; 1; 2; :::; T; T + 1; :::; T

. We set: W
0
= 1
and W
n
0
= W
d
0
= 0. Consider a security that pays W
T

  1 at T

if W
T

> 1 and zero
otherwise. This is a standard call option with strike price 1. \Default" corresponds to
the state when W
T

 1. In the notation of the paper,
V
T

=
(
W
T

  1 if W
T

> 1;
0 if W
T

 1.
Under risk neutrality and zero discounting, the time-t \rational" price of the call
equals:
p
t
= E[1
fW
T

>1g
(W
T

  1)jW
t
]
(1
fg
denotes the indicator function.)
To study the power of our test of Fact 2, we propose the following model of an
inecient (over-reacting) market. At each point in time, the actual price, ~p
t
, equals p
t
,
plus a noise term 
t
, which reects the market's irrationality. In particular,
~p
t
= max(; p
t
+ 
t
);
where  is some small, positive number, and

t
= 
n
t
X
=1
1
ft min(round(jW
d

j);10)g
(W
n

 W
n
 1
);
\round" denotes the rounding function, and 
n
is a scaling factor. (The lower bound on
prices was chosen because call option prices have to be non-negative, otherwise there is
an arbitrage opportunity; the lower bound, , must be strictly positive, in order to avoid
unbounded modied returns when (noisy) prices drop to zero.)
The noise term adds temporary shocks to the rational price. The time that the shock
W
n

 W
n
 1
at  inuences the market price is determined by W
d

, but will not exceed
ten periods.
We will refer to this noise model as the Variable Reversal Delay (VRD) model.
Assume that the increments of W
t
are those of a geometric Brownian Motion with
drift 0 and variance (0:1)
2
. If the market knows this (which implies that it has unbiased
beliefs about the probability of default), then:
p
t
= W
t
N(d
1
) N(d
2
);
where N() denotes the normal distribution function, and
d
1
=
lnW
t
0:1
p
T

  t
+ (0:5)(0:1)
p
T

  t; d
2
= d
1
  0:1
p
T

  t:
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Furthermore, we specify the increments ofW
n
t
to be independent N(0; (0:05)
2
) draws,
and those ofW
d
t
to be N(0; 1) draws. To accomodate varying levels of irrationality, we set
the scaling factor 
n
equal to 0 (no irrationality), 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.5. Because the standard
deviation of increments of W
n
t
is half that of the signal W
t
, most of the variability in
prices will still be related to rational updating, even with a scaling factor of 0.5.
When the scaling factor 
n
is as low as 0.1, the VRD model generates only small
deviations from rational pricing. This is demonstrated in Figure 22, which displays one
price path (t = 1; :::; T , with T = 80) for a call option that matured in the money (it
paid $0.35 at T

= 100). The deviations may seem inconspicuous, but they are highly
persistent. One wonders whether our test would extract power out of the persistence.
We will be able to validate this conjecture.
We deliberately use small sample sizes in the simulations. This will enable us to gauge
the small-sample properties of our test if prices are not disturbed by the VRD model.
Below, we report results from sets of 50 simulations of 50 sample paths (expect only half
of them to lead to winners!). T = 80 and T

= 100.
For each simulation of 50 sample paths, we computed the weighted average modied
return. When 
n
equals 0 (pricing is rational), Fact 2 states that this statistic is zero on
average. For nonzero 
n
s, we expect negative weighted average modied returns, because
our VRD noise model adds over-reaction to the rational price. See the discussion in
Section 3.4.
Figure 23 displays notched boxplots of the distribution of the weighted average mod-
ied return for the six sets of simulations. As the noise level increases, the distributions
are shifted downward. With zero noise, the mean of the weighted average modied re-
turn is -0.1313. With a standard error of 0.1721, this is insignicantly dierent from
zero, conrming Fact 2.
With a level of noise as low as 0.1, the mean of the weighted average modied return
is already highly signicant (with a p value less than 0.001): it equals -0.6778, and its
standard error is 0.1328. This result conrms that small deviations from rationality can
lead to rejections, as long as they are persistent, as in Figure 22.
When pricing is rational (
n
= 0), one observes negative skewness in the distribu-
tions of the weighted average modied return, because of the small sample sizes and
because modied returns are bounded from above by +1, but unbounded otherwise.
This skewness aects inference: there is a higher probability of rejecting the null in favor
of over-reaction than suggested by a test based on the normal distribution.
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Table 1
Distribution of IPO status at various points up to ten years after issue date
Reference Active Mergers Exchanges Liquidations Unknown
Point
12 Months 1809 10 1 21 15
(97.5) (0.5) (0.1) (1.1) (0.8)
24 Months 1627 48 7 109 65
(87.7) (2.6) (0.4) (5.9) (3.5)
36 Months 1442 81 13 199 121
(77.7) (4.4) (0.7) (10.7) (6.5)
48 Months 1274 122 24 288 148
(68.6) (6.6) (1.3) (15.5) (8.0)
60 Months 1113 167 36 378 162
(60.0) (9.0) (1.9) (20.4) (8.7)
72 Months 965 212 45 464 170
(52.0) (11.4) (2.4) (25.0) (9.2)
84 Months 848 247 50 541 170
(45.7) (13.3) (2.7) (29.1) (9.2)
96 Months 764 275 50 595 172
(41.2) (14.8) (2.7) (32.1) (9.3)
108 Months 689 295 51 649 172
(37.1) (15.9) (2.7) (35.0) (9.3)
120 Months 628 323 53 678 174
(33.8) (17.4) (2.9) (36.5) (9.4)
Remarks: The results are based on a merger of Ritter's 1975-84 sample and the CRSP
1995 NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ monthly return tape; Categories: (i) Active issues: CRSP
delisting code (DC) 100; (ii)Mergers: DCs 200-203; (iii) Exchanges: DCs 300-390; (iv)
Liquidations (and forced delistings): DCs 550-588, 400 and 700; (v) Unknown (and inac-
tive): DCs 500-520; Total sample size: 1856; Numbers in brackets: percentage of total.
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Figure 1: Normalized cumulative excess returns up to ten years after issue date, U.S. IPOs
in the period 1975-84. Under the null hypothesis of an ecient market with unbiased
beliefs, and barring selection biases, normalized cumulative excess returns should form
the path of a standard Brownian Motion. In particular, their distribution at month t is
N(0; t=120).
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Figure 2: Top panel: when prices increase, the modied return (based on the end-
of-period price level) is lower than the traditional return (based on the beginning-of-
period price level). Bottom panel: when prices decrease, the modied return is larger (in
absolute value) than the traditional return.
25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.4
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.5
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
time
pr
ice
rational price path: amr = 0.0005
overreaction: amr = −0.0106      
underreaction: amr = 0.0102      
Figure 3: Three price paths for a digital option that eventually matures in the money
(paying $1). amr = average modied return.
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Figure 4: Averages and 95% condence intervals (monthly modied return, return,
weighted modied return and weighted return, in excess of the three-month T bill rate)
for U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Active issues only. Results for 10 cumulative twelve-
month periods.
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Figure 5: Averages and 95% condence intervals (monthly modied return, return,
weighted modied return and weighted return, in excess of the three-month T bill rate)
for U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84,Mergers only. Results for 10 cumulative twelve-month
periods.
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Figure 6: Averages and 95% condence intervals (monthly modied return, return,
weighted modied return and weighted return, in excess of the three-month T bill rate)
for U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Exchanges only. Results for 10 cumulative twelve-
month periods.
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Figure 7: Average (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for U.S IPOs in the
period 1975-84, losers only (left panel: Liquidations; right panel: Unknown). Results for
10 cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 8: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Active issues only. Stratied by IPO Underpricing decile
(decile 1 = highest underpricing). Results for 10 cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 9: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Mergers only. Stratied by IPO Underpricing decile
(decile 1 = highest underpricing). Results for 10 cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 10: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Exchanges only. Stratied by IPO Underpricing decile
(decile 1 = highest underpricing). Results for 10 cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 11: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Active issues only. Stratied by industry classica-
tion (classes are determined by rst digit of Ritter's 3-digit SIC Code). Results for 10
cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 12: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84,Mergers only. Stratied by industry classication (classes
are determined by rst digit of Ritter's 3-digit SIC Code). Results for 10 cumulative
twelve-month periods.
35
0:1 1:1 2:1 3:1 4:1 5:1 6:1 7:1 8:1 9:1
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Class:Period (Class=0,...,9; Period=1,...,10)
Figure 13: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Exchanges only. Stratied by industry classication
(classes are determined by rst digit of Ritter's 3-digit SIC Code). Results for 10 cumu-
lative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 14: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Active issues only. Stratied by IPO price level decile
(decile 1 = lowest IPO prices). Results for 10 cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 15: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Mergers only. Stratied by IPO price level decile (decile
1 = lowest IPO prices). Results for 10 cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 16: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Exchanges only. Stratied by IPO price level decile
(decile 1 = lowest IPO prices). Results for 10 cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 17: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Active issues only. Stratied by entry rank in industry
(rst 10 entries shown). Results for 10 cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 18: Average weighted modied (excess) returns and 95% condence intervals for
U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84, Mergers only. Stratied by entry rank in industry (rst
10 entries shown). Results for 10 cumulative twelve-month periods.
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Figure 19: Return autocorrelations (up to 6th order) for U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84.
Stratied by IPO price level decile (decile 1 = lowest IPO prices). Solid lines indicate
condence bands, computed as 2=
p
NT , where N is the number of IPOs in each decile
and T the average length of the IPO aftermarket history.
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Figure 20: Return autocorrelations (up to 6th order) for U.S IPOs in the period 1975-84,
Active issues only (as of ten years after IPO date). Stratied by IPO price level decile
(decile 1 = lowest IPO prices). Results for six lags. Solid lines indicate condence bands,
computed as 2=
p
NT , where N is the number of IPOs in each decile and T the average
length of the IPO aftermarket history.
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Figure 21: Return autocorrelations (up to 6th order) for U.S IPOs in the period 1975-
84, Mergers only (as of ten years after IPO date). Stratied by IPO price level decile
(decile 1 = lowest IPO prices). Results for six lags. Solid lines indicate condence bands,
computed as 2=
p
NT , where N is the number of IPOs in each decile and T the average
length of the IPO aftermarket history.
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Figure 22: Simulation of a rational price path and the corresponding outcome when
disturbed by noise from a Variable Reversal Delay (VRD) model, for a call option that
matured in the money.
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Figure 23: Notched boxplots of weighted average modied returns on winning call op-
tions. Noise from a Variable Reversal Delay (VRD) model is added incrementally from
the left boxplot (zero noise) to the right one (noise scaling factor 
n
equal to 0.5). Each
boxplot is based on 50 simulations of 50 price paths. Notches indicate 95% condence
intervals for the median.
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